Lindsell Train Investment Trust PLC
15 November 2004
The Lindsell Train Investment Trust PLC
As at 31 October 2004
Fund Objective
To maximise long-term total returns subject to the avoidance of loss of absolute
value and with a minimum objective to maintain the real purchasing power of
Sterling capital, as measured by the annual average yield on the 2.5%
Consolidated Loan Stock.
Share Price GBP 103.50
Net Asset Value GBP 111.28
Premium (Discount) (7.0%)
Market Capitalisation GBP 20.7mn
Benchmark (21/2% Con Ann Avg Yield +5.0%) +0.4
Source: Bloomberg; NAV-Lindsell Train. Share Price
quoted is closing mid price. See Benchmark definition.
Performance History (based in GBP) 2004 YTD 2003 2002 2001 2000
Net Asset Value % +18.6 +3.0 -9.6 +3.2 n/a
Share Price % +22.4 -8.6 -19.8 +18.5 n/a
Source: Bloomberg. Based in GBP. Share Price quoted is closing mid price.
Performance years listed Jan - Dec. Launch date 22 Jan 2001. With dividends
added back.
** Please note performance data on reports prior to June 2004 did not include
dividends.
Past performance is not a guide to future performance. The price of units and
the income from them may go down as well as up. Investors may not get back what
they invested.
2003 Performance Jan 03 Feb 03 Mar 03 Apr 03 May 03 Jun 03 Jul 03 Aug 03 Sep 03 Oct 03 Nov 03 Dec 03
Net Asset Value % -3.8 +1.9 -0.6 +1.1 +3.4 +0.5 +2.0 +1.7 -2.7 -0.5 -0.7 +0.9
Share Price % +0.0 +0.5 +0.0 +0.0 +0.0 -2.8 -1.1 +2.2 -4.3 +2.2 -10.9 +6.1
2004 Performance Jan 04 Feb 04 Mar 04 Apr 04 May 04 Jun 04 Jul 04 Aug 04 Sep 04 Oct 04 Nov 04 Dec 04
Net Asset Value % +1.8 +3.2 +1.7 +0.8 +0.0 +2.3 -2.2 +4.7 +3.7 +1.3
Share Price % -2.3 +5.9 -0.6 +0.6 +2.2 +2.7 +0.5 +0.5 +8.4 +2.9
Source: Bloomberg. Based in GBP. Performance years listed Jan - Dec. Launch date
22 Jan 2001. With dividends added back.
** Please note performance data on reports prior to June 2004 did not include
dividends.
Past performance is not a guide to future performance. The price of units and
the income from them may go down as well as up. Investors may not get back what
they invested.
Industry Breakdown % of NAV
Bonds 25.5
Preference Shares 14.2
Equity - Media 8.0
Equity - Banks & Investment Co. 3.6
Equity - Leisure & Ent. 9.5
Equity - Food & Beverage 33.0
Investment Fund 23.5
Cash & Equivalent (17.3)
Total 100.0
Source: Lindsell Train
Top 10 Holdings % of NAV
Glenmorangie A&B 14.5
US Gov Treasury 6.25% 11.4
Lindsell Train Global Media (Dist) 10.1
HBOS 9.25% Non Cum 9.6
Lindsell Train Japan (Dist) 9.5
Barr AG 8.8
21/2% Consolidated Loan Stock 8.1
UK Treasury 2.5% 6.0
Cadbury Schweppes 6.0
Wolverhampton & Dudley Breweries 5.2
Source: Lindsell Train
Fund Exposure Bonds Prefs Equity Funds Cash % of NAV
UK % 14.1 14.2 47.8 3.9 (17.7) 62.3
USA % 11.4 - 2.0 - 3.3 16.7
Europe (ex UK) % - - - - - -
Japan % - - 4.3 9.5 (2.9) 10.9
Global % - - - 10.1 - 10.1
Total 25.6 14.0 54.2 23.7 (17.5) 100.0
Source: Lindsell Train
Fund Manager's Comments
In a year when all major stock market indices have made negligible progress we
have been fortunate to own a concentrated list of investments, numbering 20
securities, where all but 2 are up, the exceptions being Dow Jones and Diageo.
Of the other 18, 2 of them, Reuters and Glenmorangie are up more than 50%. Other
than the bonds, most of the positions have risen with little association to any
particular economic trend. The positive performance is random and attributable
to the merits of the individual businesses and unconnected to general market
performance, a point we have made before in other monthly reports.
One group of companies that have performed particularly well in recent months
are those involved in mining, metals production and processing, oil extraction
and chemical production whose business fortunes are largely related to the trend
of rising commodity prices. We have invested in none of these believing that the
businesses add little value, are slaves to commodity price trends that are
volatile and unpredictable and are too capital intensive to generate adequate
sustainable cash flows for investors. Rising commodity prices can transform the
economics of the businesses for short periods of time as is happening today but
as long as capital is in plentiful supply, as it is also, with long term
interest rates so low, investment in new supply quickly acts to moderate or more
likely reverse the favourable pricing environment.
Normally rising commodity prices are associated with a rise in inflation. This
historical linkage explains many investors' bearishness on bonds. Thus far, in
this economic cycle the linkage seems to have broken down, as inflation as
measured by retail prices in most major economies remains remarkably quiescent.
For us this is not surprising. As we have made plain before, we think
disinflationary forces are far more powerful and will remain prevalent for as
far out into the future as we can practically conceive. As a result, when the
current inflation in commodity prices peaks, the prices will likely be far
higher from a relative sense than if the inflation in commodity prices had
occurred at a time of general inflation, as tended to be the case in the past.
This implies that when the cycle turns down, as supply exceeds demand, the
effect on prices could be that much worse.
Take the situation of the Japanese steel industry. Only 69% of Japan's
production is sold domestically. The rest is exported. Exporting steel is
unusual especially over large distances as normally the transport costs are
prohibitive. The exception is when demand for the product exceeds domestic
supply in the importing country as it has done over the last 2 years in China.
When this happens prices usually rise, raising returns on capital and
encouraging new investment. Now, new capacity is coming on stream at a time when
demand is moderating, curtailing imports from Japan. In August China's net
imports of steel fell to level last seen in 1995 having plunged 80% in a period
of just 6 months. What may be more worrying is that China may have invested so
much in new capacity, which is now larger than that of Japan and the USA put
together (at 230m tons versus 110m tons and 93m tons respectively), that supply
for some extended period of time may exceed demand in China causing prices to
fall domestically and to plummet in Japan as cheaply produced Chinese steel
undercuts the price of domestically supplied product as China becomes a net
exporter of steel. Overnight 31% of Japan's production that was exported has no
market. The 31% overcapacity in Japan's steel industry will decimate profits and
balance sheets until capacity is shut. The conditions in the industry could
quickly become worse than even at the bottom of the last recession in 1996/97.
In this way the current rise in commodity prices, driven in a large part by the
boom in fixed investment in China, will transform China from being an
inflationary force in the global market for industrial commodities to a
deflationary one, just as China is already a deflationary force in the global
market for finished goods. It emphasises and reinforces our long held view that
the markets' response to a steeply rising price trend on the supply demand
balance is such that avoiding investments in industries and markets with such
volatile pricing characteristics is as important as choosing those with stable
ones. In the Trust's holding of the Japan Fund, with its ability to short sell,
we can be somewhat more assertive and currently have 5% of the Fund short of
steel shares and a further 12% short of commodity linked businesses.
Fund Manager Launch Date Denomination
Nick Train 22 Jan 2001 GBP
Year End Dividend Benchmark
31st Mar Ex Date: June The annual average yield on the 21/2%
Payment: August Consolidated Loan Stock.
The Board Management Fees Registered Address
Rhoddy Swire Standard Fee: 0.65% Lindsell Train Investment Trust
Michael Mackenzie Performance Fee: 10% of annual increase 77A High Street
Donald Adamson in the share price, plus dividend, Brentwood
Michael Lindsell above the gross annual yield of the 2 ESSEX CM14 4RR
1/2% Consolidated Loan Stock.
ISIN Bloomberg Listing
GB0031977944 LTI LN London Stock Exchange
Disclaimer
This document is intended for use by persons who are authorised by the UK
Financial Services Authority ('FSA') and those who are permitted to receive such
information in the UK. The information contained in this document does not
constitute an offer or invitation to buy or sell any investments. Nothing in
this document constitutes investment, legal, tax or other advice. Lindsell Train
and/or persons connected with it may have an interest in this investment. The
value of any investment in securities or funds and the income generated from
them may go down as well as up and are not guaranteed. Past performance cannot
be used as a guide or guarantee of future performance. You may not get back the
original amount you have invested. Changes in foreign exchange rates may cause
the value of your investment to go up or down. Some funds with higher gearing
may be subject to higher volatility and the investment value may change
substantially. The net asset value (NAV) performance of an investment trust is
not the same as its market share price performance.
Issued by Lindsell Train Limited
Authorised and regulated by the Financial Services Authority
15 Nov 2004 LTL 000-021-4b
Lindsell Train Limited
35 Thurloe Street, London SW7 2LQ
Tel. +44 20 7225 6400 Fax. +44 20 7225 6499
info@lindselltrain.com www.lindselltrain.com
Lindsell Train Limited is authorised and regulated by the Financial Services Authority.
This information is provided by RNS
The company news service from the London Stock Exchange
AI Summary Disclaimer BETA
The content you are viewing has been generated or assisted by artificial
intelligence (AI). While efforts are made to ensure accuracy and clarity, AI-generated text may
contain inaccuracies, outdated information, or subjective interpretations. This content is intended
for general informational purposes only and should not be considered professional advice or factual
confirmation.
We encourage you to independently verify any information provided,
especially if it will be relied upon for making decisions or taking action. Any reliance you place
on this material is strictly at your own risk. The AI system that produced this content cannot
assess the specifics of individual circumstances, and results may vary based on context and
individual needs.
*A Private Investor is a recipient of the information who meets all of the conditions set out below, the recipient:
Obtains access to the information in a personal capacity;
Is not required to be regulated or supervised by a body concerned with the regulation or supervision of investment or financial services;
Is not currently registered or qualified as a professional securities trader or investment adviser with any national or state exchange, regulatory authority, professional association or recognised professional body;
Does not currently act in any capacity as an investment adviser, whether or not they have at some time been qualified to do so;
Uses the information solely in relation to the management of their personal funds and not as a trader to the public or for the investment of corporate funds;
Does not distribute, republish or otherwise provide any information or derived works to any third party in any manner or use or process information or derived works for any commercial purposes.
Please note, this site uses cookies. Some of the cookies are essential for parts of the site to operate and have already been set. You may delete and block all cookies from this site, but if you do, parts of the site may not work. To find out more about the cookies used on Investegate and how you can manage them, see our Privacy and Cookie Policy
To continue using Investegate, please confirm that you are a private investor as well as agreeing to our Privacy and Cookie Policy & Terms.
Create an Account
Create your FREE account to receive personalised announcements, watchlists, market updates, investment insights and new features.
Personalise your experience
Tell us a little about yourself to receive personalised content, announcements and relevant investment opportunities.