Half-year Financial Report
Summary by AI BETAClose X
AVI GLOBAL TRUST PLC
('AGT' or the 'Company')
LEI: 213800QUODCLWWRVI968
Announcement of unaudited results for the half-year ended 31 March 2026
Half-Year Financial Report for the year ended 31 March 2026
A copy of the Company's Half-Year Report for the half year ended 31 March 2026 will shortly be available to view and download from the Company's website, https://www.aviglobal.co.uk. Neither the contents of the Company's website nor the contents of any website accessible from hyperlinks on the Company's website (or any other website) is incorporated into, or forms part of, this announcement.
Dividend
The Directors have declared the payment of an interim dividend of 1.50 pence per Ordinary Share for the period ended 31 March 2026, which will be paid on 24 July 2026 to Ordinary shareholders on the register at the close of business on 26 June 2026 (ex-dividend 25 June 2026).
Interim results presentation
An investor presentation, open to all existing and potential shareholders, will take place via Microsoft Teams on 11 June 2026 at 11:00 GMT. It will be hosted by Joe Bauernfreund, Portfolio Manager and CEO/CIO at Asset Value Investors, alongside Tom Treanor, Head of Research. In this webinar, Joe and Tom will provide insights into AVI Global Trust's performance over the period and discuss key engagements with portfolio companies. There will be an opportunity for Q&A following the presentation.
Please register by clicking here or contacting info@assetvalueinvestors.com.
The following text is copied from the Half-Year Report:
OBJECTIVE
The investment objective of the Company is to achieve capital growth through a focused portfolio of investments, particularly in companies whose shares stand at a discount to estimated underlying net asset value.
FINANCIAL HIGHLIGHTS
- Net asset value ('NAV') total return per share decreased -5.0%
- Share price total return -6.7%
- Benchmark index± increased on a total return basis +2.1%
- Interim dividend maintained from last year, at 1.50p
PERFORMANCE SUMMARY
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Six months to |
Six months to |
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31 March 2026 |
31 March 2025 |
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Net asset value per share (total return) 1* |
-5.0 |
+1.0% |
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Share price total return* |
-6.7 |
+0.8% |
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31 March 2026 |
31 March 2025 |
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Discount* (difference between share price and net asset value)2 |
8.5% |
9.2% |
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Earnings and Dividends |
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Investment income |
£18.93m |
£15.87m |
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Revenue earnings per share |
2.25p |
2.75p |
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Capital earnings per share* |
(17.81)p |
(1.78)p |
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Total earnings per share |
(15.29)p |
0.97p |
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Ordinary dividends per share |
1.50 |
1.50p |
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Ongoing Charges Ratio (annualised)* |
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Management, marketing and other expenses as a percentage of average shareholders' funds |
0.89% |
0.85% |
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Period Highs/Lows |
High |
Low |
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Net asset value per share |
288.50p |
257.97p |
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Net asset value per share (debt at fair value) |
292.51p |
261.98p |
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Share price (mid market) |
272.50p |
239.50p |
1 As per guidelines issued by the Association of Investment Companies ('AIC'), performance is calculated using net asset value per share inclusive of accrued income and debt marked to fair value.
2 As per guidelines issued by the AIC, the discount is calculated using the net asset value per share inclusive of accrued income and with the debt marked to fair value.
Buybacks
During the six months ended 31 March 2026 the Company purchased 10,305,000 Ordinary Shares for cancellation for an aggregate consideration of £26,553,000 adding +0.2% to AGT's NAV.
*Alternative Performance Measures
For all Alternative Performance Measures included in this Report, please see definitions in the Glossary in the Half-Year Report.
± MSCI All Country World Index, please refer to the Glossary in the Half-Year Report for further information.
CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT
The geopolitical environment has continued to prove unpredictable, bringing with it bouts of market volatility. This was underscored when the US and Israel abandoned diplomacy in favour of military attacks on Iran, starting at the end of February 2026. Over the five months to that point we were in positive territory in absolute terms, albeit marginally behind the comparator benchmark. Overall, the NAV total return for the six months under review was -5.0% compared with +2.1% for the benchmark, which was naturally disappointing but unsurprising given the market backdrop in March.
Prior to the setback in March, there were some encouraging signs in markets. Interest had broadened from the small group of technology stocks which had dominated market indices in recent years, as investors apparently began to focus again on valuations and opportunities around the world. There were some notable positive returns in the portfolio, driven largely by Asian stocks, which our investment managers have favoured on valuation grounds, and the likelihood of releasing value. As at the end of February 2026, AGT's NAV per share and share price were both at the highest level that they had ever been1. In March, as often happens, discounts widened in the volatile markets resulting from the conflict in Iran and the effect on the oil price. This dragged down returns. Times like this have in the past presented our managers with a number of opportunities and we now have a very attractively valued portfolio.
Revenue and dividend
Revenue earnings for the six months under review amounted to 2.52 pence per share. The Company will pay an interim dividend of 1.5 pence per share, which is the same level as last year.
While it is too early to predict revenue earnings for the full accounting year, the Board intends to at least maintain the final dividend, absent any unforeseen events, so that the total dividend with respect to the current accounting year will be at least 4.5 pence per share.
The Board recognises that a dividend which is steady and able to rise over time is attractive to many shareholders and, while we do aim to grow the dividend over the long term, I will repeat my previous statement that the portfolio
is managed primarily for capital growth.
Share price rating and marketing
We remain committed to our substantial marketing budget and the Board works closely with AVI as it seeks to generate demand for AGT's shares. Each month, AVI produces an informative factsheet which is available on our website and I encourage you to register to receive these when they are published. The website contains a wealth of information on the investments in the portfolio, and I also encourage you to visit it regularly for up-to-date information. AVI is very active in both traditional and social media and has increased its use of video content as we seek to promote our investment proposition to a growing investor base.
The investment trust industry continues to be under pressure and we continue to use share buybacks when AGT's share price discount is unnaturally wide and when the Board believes that buying back shares is in the best interests of shareholders.
We were again active in buying back shares in the period under review, buying some 10.3 million shares, which is 2.4% of the shares in circulation at the start of the period. Share buybacks benefit shareholders by limiting the discount at which they could sell shares if they so wish. Buying back shares at a discount also produced an uplift in the NAV per share, to the benefit of continuing shareholders, of approximately 0.2% over the period under review. The Board believes that the discount can close steadily over time, and that held true for most of the period under review. However, the war in Iran affected AGT's share price in March and the discount at the end of the period had widened marginally to 8.5%. We continue to believe that the discount will naturally narrow in the long term, but remain pragmatic in our approach to the use of share buybacks.
Annual General Meeting
The Company's Annual General Meeting on 19 December 2025 was, for the first time, available over the internet via a live stream and I am pleased to report that this enabled many more shareholders to attend the meeting. The system worked well, and it was helpful to be able to take questions both from shareholders in the room and online.
The Board
In our Annual Report for the year to 30 September 2025, the Board disclosed that it would seek a replacement for Calum Thomson who, having completed a nine year term, will retire at the AGM in December 2026. We have appointed a recruitment agency to assist in identifying suitable candidates and expect to announce the appointment of a new Director shortly.
Outlook
Since 31 March markets have continued to be volatile, with large price swings driven by news and comments around the war in the Middle East. Overall, the Company's NAV has recovered from the low point and has reversed the fall which was experienced over the first half of our financial year. At present, the uncertainty is fuelling concern about continuing high levels of inflation in both energy and food prices. Our Investment Manager continues to focus on seeking undervalued companies in situations where there is the realistic prospect of improvement. We remain encouraged by the value that AVI perceive in our portfolio and believe that a collection of investments based on robust asset values should serve shareholders well in unpredictable times.
In short there is a lot to worry about. But there is also a lot to be excited about. Investor attention and passive capital flows have left the parts of the market upon which our Investment Manager focuses overlooked and undervalued - as indicated by the portfolio weighted average discount which stands at approximately 40%.
Graham Kitchen
Chairman
3 June 2026
1 Share price and NAV at all-time high levels after adjustment for share split.
INVESTMENT MANAGER'S REPORT
Performance Review
When we wrote to you a year ago, the world and markets were in a state of disarray following President Trump's upending of the global trade system and so-called liberation day tariffs. Whilst markets recovered from that setback, today we find ourselves writing to you with the world arguably even more uncertain, and the risks even greater, following coordinated attacks on Iran by the US and Israel, the subsequent outbreak of war and one of the worst, if not the worst, oil crisis in history.
Within this context, over the interim period, AGT's NAV returned -5.0%, which compares to a return of +2.1% for our comparator benchmark, the MSCI AC World Index (£).
Prior to the outbreak of the war, at the end of February, AGT's NAV was up by +5.2% for the Financial Year to date, which was c.170bps1 behind the benchmark. In March, the NAV decreased by -9.8%. The portfolio behaved in line with our previous experience of such market conditions, with the portfolio weighted average discount widening to -42% from -38% over the course of the month (and from -37% in September 2025), serving as a headwind to performance. Such wide discounts have previously only been observed at times of intense market stress and do not tend to persist.
Asian and emerging markets bore the brunt of this volatility, and with 20% and 15% of AGT's NAV in Japan and South Korea, this was a painful headwind to performance. Readers will well know that our portfolios are constructed from the bottom-up, and are agnostic of benchmark considerations, but it is interesting to note when decomposing returns in March, our large 'overweight' allocation to South Korea, which represents only 1% of the index, accounted for more than half of the underperformance. In our view, both Japan and South Korea remain highly compelling markets, with high quality companies, cheap valuations, and tailwinds from governance reform.
Indeed, over the interim period, the largest contributors were all Asian-focused companies. This was led by Jardine Matheson (+68bps), the Keswick family-controlled holding company, which we (re)-introduced to the portfolio approximately one year ago. Other notable contributors were Tokyo Gas (+66bps), HD Hyundai (+65bps), and Toyota Industries (+62bps).
At the other end of the portfolio, Vivendi, the French holding company, was the largest detractor (-297bps), suffering from a double whammy of NAV weakness and discount widening. We continued to see material upside and added to the position over the period. Post period-end UMG has been the subject of a takeover proposal (of sorts) which we discuss further below, and Vivendi shares have risen by more than 30% off the lows so far in April. Other large detractors were Chrysalis (-254bps), News Corp (-106bps) and Gerresheimer (-99bps).
During the period, we exited what was our then-largest position in Toyota Industries, following a revised take-private bid for the company, which was in line with our thesis. This generated proceeds of just over £100m (c.9% of AGT's NAV) and we believe exemplifies AGT's bold approach in making asymmetric situations move the needle. We have also continued to clean up the tail of smaller holdings, exiting less successful investments in Entain and Gerresheimer. We have continued to deploy capital into existing and new names, with the most notable shift being the continued increased weight in South Korea, which now accounts for 15% of NAV, versus 8% in September.
The Toyota Industries sale has also had the effect of moving AGT to a modest net cash position, having been 5.5% geared as at 30 September 2025. This gives us meaningful (c. £140m) firepower to deploy and exploit the historically wide discounts currently on offer in our investment universe.
The macroeconomic and geopolitical background remains worrying and fascinating in equal measure. Henry Kissinger described Trump as 'one of those figures in history who appears from time to time to mark the end of an era and to force it to give up its old pretences'. Such epochal changes are often fraught, and the new world order seems to be characterised by volatility - in geopolitics, energy and inflation. So far this has not spilt over into real equity or bond market volatility, but that could of course still come.
In such a complex and changing environment, our experience tells us the key is to focus on the fundamentals; asset quality, rock solid balance sheets and aligned owners and managers, are all things that we suspect will show their importance. Valuations, as indicated by the -42% portfolio weighted average discount, are historically wide. We have ample firepower to deploy into new and existing names, and believe that a focus on catalysts, events and activism will be key tools to navigate the path ahead.
1 See Glossary in Half Year Report
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Contributors and Detractors for the six months ending 31 March 2026 |
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Contributors |
Contribution* |
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Jardine Matheson Holdings |
68bps |
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Tokyo Gas |
66bps |
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HD Hyundai |
65bps |
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Toyota Industries Corp. |
62bps |
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Symphony International Holdings |
49bps |
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Detractors |
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Vivendi |
-297bps |
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Chrysalis Investments |
-254bps |
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News Corp |
-106bps |
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Gerresheimer AG |
-99bps |
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EXOR |
-63bps |
* Contribution is the percentage amount that a position has added to the Company's net asset value over the six-month period.
CONTRIBUTORS
Jardine Matheson
Classification: Holding Company
% of net assets: 6.0%
Discount: 31%
% of investee company: 0.4%
Total return on position HY26 (local): 13.2%
Total return on position HY26 (GBP): 15.1%
Contribution (GBP): 68bps
ROI since date of initial purchase: 38.4%
Jardine Matheson ('JM') was our largest contributor over the period, adding +68bps to NAV, as the share price returned +15% (GBP), driven by strong NAV performance (+23%), offset by moderate discount widening, from 25% to 31%.
In April last year, we reinitiated an investment in JM and the holding is now 6.0% of AGT's NAV. JM is the Hong Kong-based holding company of the Keswick family, and currently trades at a -31% discount. Longer-term followers of AGT will remember that we have invested in JM and other parts of the group structure at various points over the last 25 years, and it is a name which we know well.
The company's history dates back to 1832, as a leading trading house heavily involved in goods like cotton, tea, and silk. Almost 200 years later, and now on the fifth generation of family control, the company has vastly expanded, with interests spread across property, hotels, retail, autos and financial services. Many of these are through controlling stakes in listed assets such as Hongkong Land ('HKL') (31% of NAV), Astra (via Jardine Cycle & Carriage (27%)), DFI Retail (14%) and the recently privatised Mandarin Oriental (9%).
The company is currently in the process of a gradual evolution towards becoming a modern holding company, moving away from an owner-operator model, to one of an engaged shareholder.
Since Ben Keswick took over as Chairman in 2019, the owner-operator approach has changed significantly. Multiple portfolio companies are now appointing external candidates to senior leadership positions, and JM is itself looking to bring in highly experienced sector specialists to run its portfolio businesses, replacing long-standing employees.
The idea behind this is that JM is now moving away from the direct, day-to-day management of the portfolio companies, focussing instead on board seat representation, reviewing growth strategies and capital allocation policies of the portfolio companies while allowing experienced, professional management to run day-to-day operations.
With the new CEOs looking dispassionately at their businesses, we are already starting to see positive developments, with strategic reviews conducted at Hongkong Land, DFI and Mandarin Oriental. These have focussed on simplifying their structures, asset realisations, and shareholder returns, with a much-awaited strategic review at Astra International later this year.
At HKL, the largest part of JM's NAV, the company's pivot towards asset management - focussing on mixed use projects in Asian gateway cities - while also planning an exit from their build-to-sell residential business, should lead to a more stable and higher quality earnings stream, which we believe will be rewarded with a higher multiple (and thus narrower discount).
Although execution of the new strategy is key, the market has already rewarded HKL for delivering on its new approach (+23% over the reporting period), with the announcement of their first private Real Estate Investment Trust and the partial sale of Exchange Square in Hong Kong at a reported capitalisation rate of 3.1% amongst others. Positively, HKL had committed to recycling US$4bn of assets by 2027 and has achieved 90% with the aforementioned transactions. The company has earmarked 20% of the recycled capital for share buybacks which we view positively due to the c. 43% discount to NAV at which HKL trades.
Mandarin Oriental performed a strategic review last year, highlighting their move into an asset light, managed properties model. However, in October last year, JM announced their intention to take the company private, acquiring the remaining 12% that they did not already own. This announcement was made in conjunction with the sale of thirteen floors of their mixed use One Causeway Bay development, which had long been flagged for sale. This sale and special dividend paid to Mandarin Oriental shareholders essentially funded the purchase of the 12% that JM did not already own, further enhancing our belief that the company is delivering on selling non-core assets and using those proceeds for value accretive transactions.
Going forward, the company has clearly communicated that they only want to own assets in which they can have decisive influence and DFI Retail has certainly delivered on this message, with equity stakes in listed Robinsons Retail and Yonghui sold over the last 12 months, with proceeds used to pay down debt and returned to shareholders via a special dividend (JM received US$465m).
There have also been significant and exciting changes at JM itself. Lincoln Pan was appointed CEO in December 2025, replacing the outgoing John Witt who oversaw many of the positive steps outlined above. Lincoln provides a wealth of private equity experience, joining from PAG where he built up their non-China business. His appointment has been further bolstered by the hire of Ming Lu (formerly of KKR), to the Board, to enhance their private equity and portfolio management capabilities.
Lincoln is already beginning to communicate the strategy convincingly and is working with Astra International on their strategic review, which should be released in the coming months. We would expect this to follow a similar path to other group companies, focussing on capital efficiency and better quality, and growing earnings. This will most likely lead to asset sales, as they look to exit various business lines which are not meeting their required returns.
We are excited about the future performance of JM and its underlying companies, as the strategic reviews already conducted begin to bear fruit alongside further asset sales and portfolio simplification.
Tokyo Gas
Classification: Asset-backed Special Situation
% of net assets: 2.9%
Discount: 37%
% of investee company: 0.2%
Total return on position HY26 (local): 41.5%
Total return on position HY26 (GBP): 33.9%
Contribution (GBP): 66bps
ROI since date of initial purchase: 37.1%
Tokyo Gas was one of your Company's strongest contributors in the interim period, adding 66bps to NAV as its shares generated a return of +34% (GBP).
As a reminder, Tokyo Gas is Japan's largest city gas utility company, boasting 30% Liquid Natural Gas market share across the greater Tokyo region. AVI's attraction is to the significant and undervalued real estate portfolio, which has been independently appraised to be worth c. 60% of Tokyo Gas' market capitalisation. This portfolio is heavily concentrated around three key assets, including the Shinjuku Park Tower, home to the iconic Park Hyatt Tokyo. The Tokyo Gas stub, the implied multiple ascribed to the underlying gas business after stripping out the value of the real estate portfolio, trades at just 4.3x forward EBITDA1 against utility peers at 9-10x.
The performance in the period was driven primarily by a dramatic earnings recovery in the 2025 financial year, with first quarter net income up by +439% year-on-year, as higher gas prices in the US fed through to Tokyo Gas' overseas shale operations. Compounding this earnings momentum, the company continued to execute strongly on its total shareholder return policy, generating a dividend yield of close to 10% on the opening share price. The strong price performance saw the stub re-rate from 3.0x forward EBITDA at the end of September to 4.3x at the end of March.
On 25 March 2026, the company unveiled its new Medium-Term Management Plan, which confirmed a strong recurring profit target and a progressive dividend. However, the capital allocation framework fell short of what we believe is required to further drive a re-rating in the shares. The shareholder return targets and real estate divestment plans both appear conservative relative to the scale of the opportunity. This leaves meaningful work still to do on the engagement front, and AVI intends to continue pressing management to be more ambitious in returning capital and accelerating the rationalisation of the non-core property portfolio.
As we look ahead, one development that we note with particular interest is the reopening of the Shinjuku Park Tower hotel following a period of renovation. Tokyo Gas' management previously indicated that this asset, which we estimate represents c. 11% of market cap, may not be considered core to their operations. We believe that the reopening of the building may position this asset for divestment over the medium term, which at appraised value would represent a meaningful catalyst for further multiple expansion.
We continue to see further upside from what has been a successful investment to date, generating an ROI1 of +37% vs +6% for the MSCI ACWI (GBP).
HD Hyundai
Classification: Holding Company
% of net assets: 2.0%
Discount: 41%
% of investee company: 0.2%
Total return on position HY26 (local): 46.2%
Total return on position HY26 (GBP): 39.8%
Contribution (GBP): 65bps
ROI since date of initial purchase: 56.9%
HD Hyundai added +65bps to NAV as its shares generated a return of approximately +40% (GBP), driven by the tightening of the discount from 59% to 41% over the period.
As a reminder, HD Hyundai is a c.£9bn South Korean-listed family-controlled industrial holding company.
The portfolio is anchored by three key assets, worth 143% of market cap in total, each of which is currently riding structural tailwinds which are driving revenue growth and margin expansion: 1) a 35% stake in HD Korea Shipbuilding & Offshore Engineering ('KSOE'; 30% of NAV); 2) a 37% stake in HD Hyundai Electric ('Electric';
39% of NAV); and 3) a 55% stake in HD Hyundai Marine Solution (16% of NAV).
KSOE is the world's largest shipbuilder by capacity and the global leader in Liquefied Natural Gas ('LNG') carrier construction and advanced propulsion technologies. We expect KSOE to be the primary beneficiary of the current structural upcycle in shipbuilding, driven by accelerating fleet replacement demand - the average age of the global fleet is c. 23 years - tightening ship emissions regulations, and sustained LNG trade growth from US export
terminals.
KSOE's current order backlog extends to nearly four years and is heavily tilted toward premium, environmentally compliant vessels. As these orders flow through into KSOE's income statement, we expect the company's operating margins to expand upwards towards the high teens/low twenties, having averaged just 2% over the last 15 years. Despite the ongoing upcycle, we estimate that KSOE trades at a c. 50% discount to its own sum-of-the-parts. As we look ahead, the key catalyst for KSOE will be the implementation of the US-Korea shipbuilding cooperation, which will provide further earnings upside optionality.
Electric, meanwhile, is a leading manufacturer of high-voltage transformers, gas-insulated switchgears, and other grid systems. It has been a structural beneficiary of the global electricity grid modernisation cycle, having grown operating profit at +46% per annum since listing in 2017.
The structural opportunity for Electric remains compelling, with the US electricity grid being, in many areas, over 40 years old, with utility companies now issuing multi-year tenders to replace grid components at scale. This replacement cycle has been meaningfully accelerated by the surge in power demand from AI data centres, which require reliable, high-capacity grid infrastructure and are driving a step-change in electricity consumption that ageing networks were not designed to accommodate.
Supply has not kept pace with demand, as high-voltage transformers are complex to manufacture and capital-intensive, with lead times having doubled since 2021, giving well-positioned incumbents like Electric the ability to secure long-dated contracts at structurally higher prices.
Although the discount at HD Hyundai has narrowed from extreme levels, having been in the mid-60s when we first invested, we remain optimistic for the prospect of further NAV compounding at HD Hyundai, driven by the tailwinds at its underlying assets.
To date, we have generated an ROI of +57% in just eight months. As such we reduced the position to take some profits as the discount narrowed to 41%.
Toyota Industries
Classification: Asset-backed Special Situation
% of net assets: 0.0%
Discount: nm
% of investee company: 0.0%
Total return on position HY26 (local): 8.8%
Total return on position HY26 (GBP): 8.0%
Contribution (GBP): 62bps
ROI since date of initial purchase: 15.3%
Toyota Industries ('TICO') added +62bps to your Company's NAV over the period. The returns were driven by the successful, if hard-fought, conclusion of the takeover battle for TICO.
As a reminder, TICO is a Japanese-listed industrial conglomerate controlled by the Toyota Group, with its operations principally comprising: 1) the leading global manufacturer of forklifts with approximately 28% global market share; 2) the second-largest global player in automated logistics solutions; and 3) the supply of automotive components to Toyota Motor.
Despite owning multiple world-class operating businesses, TICO had for years been run primarily for the benefit of its controlling shareholder rather than its minority investors - best exemplified by the large portfolio of cross shareholdings in Toyota-affiliated companies that sat on its balance sheet, representing c. 60% of the company's market cap.
Toyota Fudosan launched an initial takeover bid at ¥16,300 per share in June 2025, a price that we regarded as a significant undervaluation and which we had publicly opposed as a co-signatory to an open letter from the Asian Corporate Governance Association. A revised bid at ¥18,800 per share followed in January 2026, again falling materially short of book value, and again failing to attract the required minority shareholder support.
It was in the wake of this failed revised bid that we increased our position to make TICO AGT's largest holding, at an 8.3% weight. With Elliott Management having built a stake exceeding 7% and the required shareholder offer threshold looking increasingly out of reach, the asymmetry of the situation was, in our view, very compelling. The Toyota group needed the deal to succeed, and we believed that a further price increase was a matter of when, not if.
That increase came on 2 March 2026, when Toyota Fudosan raised its offer to ¥20,600 per share, which would make this the largest-ever acquisition of a Japanese company.
While the final offer is a materially better outcome than the one initially proposed, it remains, in our assessment, a significant undervaluation of TICO's true intrinsic value.
Nonetheless, we regard this as a good outcome in relative terms, and an important one for the broader investment case for activism in Japan. The final price was the product of sustained minority shareholder engagement, with successive bid increases driven by a refusal to accept inadequate terms.
It is AVI's belief that the case sets a meaningful precedent for the c. 200 other parent-child listed subsidiary relationships in Japan, raising the bar for deal process quality and pricing fairness in future privatisations. For AVI's strategy, which is predicated on closing the gap between price and intrinsic value, Toyota Industries remains an encouraging proof of concept.
Symphony International Holdings
Classification: Closed-ended Fund
% of net assets: 2.6%
Discount: 46%
% of investee company: 15.7%
Total return on position HY26 (local): 23.0%
Total return on position HY26 (GBP): 25.5%
Contribution (GBP): 49bbs
ROI since date of initial purchase: 41.4%
At extreme absolute levels of discount, the maths is such that an apparently modest change in discount levels results in outsized share price performance. This was the case with Symphony International Holdings ('SIHL') which saw its shares increase in value by +22% on the back of its discount to NAV moving in from 57% to 46%. There was little news over the period.
As a reminder, SIHL is a London-listed closed-end fund investing in predominately Asian private companies. We first invested in SIHL in 2012. Following a sustained period of private engagement on matters relating to governance and capital allocation, we took our concerns public in 2021. In September 2023, the company announced that it would pursue an orderly realisation of its investments. While progress to date has been extremely limited, we were somewhat encouraged by the commentary in the company's annual report published in April 2026 with a much-improved level of transparency and communication on the disposal processes. We note this followed an AVI letter to the Manager which became public.
With any company in run-off however, actions speak louder than words, and this applies even more so with a serial disappointment such as SIHL. That SIHL's shares trade at such a wide discount despite the company having adopted a managed wind-up strategy reflects, in our view, scepticism around a management team that has historically prioritised its own interests over those of shareholders; uncertainty over the timeframe over which realisations will take place; and - as is often the case with investment companies with unlisted assets - wariness over whether the carrying values of assets are an accurate reflection of realisable values. We await news on disposals with interest and continue to apply pressure to hold the management team to account.
DETRACTORS
Vivendi SE
Classification: Holding Company
% of net assets: 5.0%
Discount:49%
% of investee company: 3.3%
Total return on position HY26 (local): -40.0%
Total return on position HY26 (GBP): -40.0%
Contribution (GBP): -297bps
ROI since date of initial purchase: -30.2%
Vivendi was the most significant detractor over the interim period, with a total return of -40%, costing us -297bps as the shares suffered a double whammy of NAV weakness and discount widening.
From a high in late July 2025, the shares have now declined by -50%, as the NAV has declined by -38% and the discount has gone from 36% to 49% (a return of -20%).
Starting with the discount, the proximate cause of the widening discount was a ruling by the French Cour de Cassation in November 2025 in favour of Vincent Bolloré, thereby largely eliminating the chance of him being forced to buy Vivendi minorities out in the near-term. Since this point however, there has also been considerable pain on the NAV side of the equation, as Universal Music Group ('UMG') shares have de-rated to a record low valuation and share price.
Since its IPO, UMG has performed poorly as a stock in both absolute terms but particularly in relative terms - where its market cap has gone from parity with that of Spotify to c. one-third of the value. Whilst growth has exceeded expectations, there has been considerable debate and disappointment around margins, free cash flow and capital allocation, with a further distraction of Vincent Bolloré and a perceived overhang.
2025 full year results, published in March, in many ways encapsulated this, with much stronger than anticipated revenue growth, offset by weaker margins, and €404m of Royalty Advances and €280m of catalogue investments. Whilst we have sympathy for the bears' complaints and believe that the company could be run in a much more dynamic and shareholder friendly manner, we believe that investors have become too despondent, with - at the end of March 2026 - the shares trading at c.13x 2026 estimated earnings net of the stake in Spotify. We believe this value to simply be too cheap given UMG's structural position in the music value chain and the attractive tailwinds from the re-monetisation of music.
It would appear that others agree. In late March the company launched an inaugural €500m share buyback programme; and in early April Bill Ackman/Pershing Square ('PS') launched a proposed offer for the company at an ostensible +78% premium, by way of a merger with Pershing Square SPARC Holdings, a blank cheque acquisition company. The large theoretical paper element of the deal value - predicated on new UMG trading at 25x 2027 estimated post-transaction EPS1 - warrants some scepticism as is indicated by the shares trading at a price of less than €20 versus the proposed transaction value of €30.40 and the cash offer of €22.
What happens next comes down to Vincent Bolloré, who through Bolloré SE and Vivendi controls c.28% of UMG. He is notoriously difficult to predict, and we will refrain from attempting to do so. Rather, what we can say is that the PS proposal highlights UMG's deep undervaluation and the significant self-help measures that the company has at its disposal to unlock and create shareholder value.
The combination of strong NAV growth potential and Vivendi's close to 50% discount appear extremely compelling.
Vivendi has been a bruising investment but not one which we would consider to be a mistake. The discount has widened materially, and UMG has become demonstrably cheaper too, at a time when the fundamentals have been improving. In such situations one can afford to be patient. Exactly what happens next is hard to predict, but with Vivendi at close to a 50% discount and UMG deeply undervalued, the ingredients for attractive long-term returns are in place. We added to the position over the period.
Chrysalis Investments
Classification: Closed-ended Fund
% of net assets: 6.0%
Discount: 48%
% of investee company: 15.9%
Total return on position HY26 (local): -32.0%
Total return on position [HY26 (GBP): -32.0%
Contribution (GBP): -254bps
ROI since date of initial purchase: 1.2%
Having been a substantial positive contributor over AGT's previous financial year, Chrysalis ('CHRY') was our second largest detractor in the first half of this financial year.
While this was in part due to the poor performance of now-listed Klarna and a write-down at wefox, the bulk of the decline was due to discount widening as the shares moved from a 29% discount to 48%.
Initially, this seemed attributable to the shares being caught up in the AI disruption/tech sell off. In our view, CHRY's portfolio companies have little in common with the software as a service ('SaaS') businesses in the market's firing line. While Starling Bank, CHRY's largest holding, has a SaaS-style subsidiary called Engine which provides banking software to third-party clients, this is still a nascent part of Starling's current value (although it certainly does have the potential to grow into a more meaningful value driver). Furthermore, we do not expect businesses with such deep specialist domain knowledge, operating in arguably the most regulated and risk-averse industry, to have their business models disrupted by "DIY" tools.
It is a matter of public record that we have been engaged with the Board on the company's future, and as such we were supportive of the proposals announced in February 2026 that would see the company adopt an orderly realisation policy with no new investments being made. These proposals were approved by shareholders at a meeting in late-March. Ahead of this, the shares took another leg down when it was disclosed that the Board has so far been unable to reach an agreement with the existing management team on commercial terms for them to continue in their roles and that, if no agreement is reached, the company will adopt a self-managed structure. In the event of such an outcome, we are confident that the board has the necessary skills, mindset and experience to oversee the realisation process, particularly with the recent appointment of an AVI-proposed director, Sam Dobbyn.
We see scope for highly attractive prospective returns from here.
News Corp
Classification: Holding Company
% of net assets: 7.0%
Discount: 46%
% of investee company: 1.0%
Total return on position HY26 (local): -17.1%
Total return on position HY26 (GBP): -15.4%
Contribution (GBP): -106bps
ROI since date of initial purchase: 9.9%
News Corp, the Murdoch family controlled holding company, detracted -106bps from returns. Over the period, the shares declined by -19%, which was a function of a -10% decline in the NAV and the discount widening by 600bps to 46%.
Starting with the NAV, the central theme was AI - and the perceived risk to the classified ads businesses (REA, 34% of News Corp NAV) and information services / data businesses (Dow Jones, 46% of NAV).
Starting with REA, the shares declined by -32% over the period, when global classified ad businesses sold off over fears that AI would disrupt and impair such business models. As we have explained before, such businesses exhibit "winner takes most" dynamics, with strong network effects, whereby listing inventory and user traffic mutually reinforce one another. The dominant #1 player in a category typically receives 2-6x the traffic of the #2, and becomes the reference point for individuals or businesses looking to buy and sell in that vertical. Rightmove is an example for houses in the UK.
From this integral position, leading classified ads businesses exhibit high levels of pricing power. These dynamics translate into excellent financial profiles, with healthy organic growth rates and typical EBITDA margins of 40-60% which, given minimal capex requirements, results in very high free cash flow conversion. The market has rewarded these traits with premium valuation multiples as a response, and REA has historically traded at the top of the pack given its vendor-led pricing model, superior growth and margin performance.
At its heart, the worry is that AI represents a step change that will see power shift away from the classified portals toward AI agents, which increasingly become the consumer-facing window of the internet. Over time, this will erode or equalise the traffic and volume advantage of incumbents, commodifying the network effect. This results in lower long-term growth and margins.
Whilst such scenarios are worrying - particularly for businesses previously perceived and priced to be impenetrable - we believe that such risks are overstated.
In particular, we believe that this view understates the data advantage of leading portals, the strength of the network (are agents really going to accept not being on the #1 portal?) and consumer-nature, both in terms of how real estate is a browsing experience-led category suited to a specialist platform, and in terms of whether consumers want to outsource high-stakes infrequent decisions to a generic AI black box. As with other technological developments, classified marketplaces will likely emerge in good health, likely in cohabitation, not competition with Large Language Models ('LLMS').
REA shares now sit c.40% below their all-time high price and have de-rated to a decade low (but still fairly lofty) 18x next 12 months projected EV/EBITDA1. Whilst REA's expensive valuation has always been a key risk to our News Corp investment case, we believe that returns can be attractive if the fundamentals disprove the AI bear case over time.
Turning to Dow Jones, in 2026 information services and data-rich businesses have de-rated meaningfully, with the proximate cause being the launch of the Claude Cowork Legal Plugin, which led to a sharp reassessment of the threats which AI poses to such businesses. We believe that the effects of AI disruption will not be evenly distributed, and that proprietary data assets with high degrees of workflow integration and high switching costs (such as Risk & Compliance), or where trust and market standard setting is important (such as Oil Price Information Service), will not only survive but prosper as AI serves as an accelerant for such data.
This view was re-affirmed by Dow Jones' investor day, which was held in March. The company set out plans to grow EBITDA from $558m in FY2025 to more than $1bn over the next five years (which was c.14% above analysts' consensus). We came away highly impressed, both with the content of the day, but also the depth and breadth of Dow Jones' management team, which we believe to be befitting of a public company.
Turning to the discount, the move from 40% to 46% was a painful headwind to returns. The on-going strategic review is now pretty long in the tooth. However, the prize on offer from extracting value from the ex-REA stub - and Dow Jones in particular - remains compelling, with Dow Jones alone worth more than 2x the stub. We added to the position on share price weakness in February 2026 and have made a c.+10% return on these additional shares. The onus is on the family and management to unlock value and drive substantially higher returns.
Gerresheimer
Classification: Holding Company
% of net assets: 0.0%
Discount: nm
% of investee company: 0.0%
Total return on position HY26 (local): -29.0%
Total return on position HY26 (GBP): -29.1%
Contribution (GBP): -99bps
ROI since date of initial purchase: -62.8%
Gerresheimer, the German conglomerate, detracted -99bps over an interim period where we exited the position.
As readers may remember, we established a position in Gerresheimer in late 2024 with a simple investment thesis: the business traded at a significant conglomerate discount and the ongoing strategic review of the Moulded Glass business had the potential to unlock this and shine a light on the more valuable pharmaceutical primary packaging assets, with some optionality around a take private transaction given repeated private equity interest at prices well above the then share price.
Whilst the thesis was simple, our experience was anything but. The business fundamentals deteriorated rapidly and were weaker than originally assessed; management - of whom we had been sceptical - showed themselves to be more inept and less straightforward than we expected; the Supervisory Board provided disappointingly little supervision or indeed vision; and all of these ills were magnified by an overly leveraged capital structure following the disastrous Bormioli acquisition.
Whilst we engaged extensively - both in public and private - with the board and management, and were pleased to see management changes, we came to the decision to exit the investment. The original thesis was broken and Gerresheimer no longer represented the kind of investment that we would make afresh. Locking in such losses is not something that we do lightly, but it appears to have been the correct decision, with the stock price down by more than -25% from our average selling price.
EXOR
Classification: Holding Company
% of net assets: 4.6%
Discount: 57%
% of investee company: 0.4%
Total return on position HY26 (local): 13.5%
Total return on position HY26 (GBP): 13.3%
Contribution (GBP): -63bps
ROI since date of initial purchase: 21.6%
EXOR - the Agnelli family-controlled holding company detracted -63bps. Over the interim period, the shares fell -21%, which was a function of a -14% decline in the NAV and the discount widening -355bps to -57%.
Starting with the NAV, both Ferrari (35% of NAV) and Stellantis (9%) endured difficult periods, with share price returns of -30% and -23%, respectively. In NAV terms, Ferrari's weakness was the much more consequential. The cause for this was Ferrari's 2025 investor day - held in October - which reset expectations lower for revenue growth and margins. The company now guides for sales growth of +5% through to 2030, with consensus expectations having been for +7-8%. In turn, investors are now re-pricing Ferrari following a period of exceptional growth which, with the shares trading at a then 44x forward PE multiple, were priced to continue for longer. This is a painful adjustment and, despite management's track record of under-promising and over-delivering, not one that can be pushed away. Ferrari shares now sit some -40% below where EXOR sold c.16% of its stake in early 2025 and trade at a still not obviously cheap 29x 2027 EPS. In our view, one of the attractions of diversified family-controlled holding companies is the patience it allows one to hold high quality businesses through periods of transition. So, whilst the near-term is cloudier, on the Agnelli's longer term view, the outlook is as compelling as ever: Ferrari as a brand is adored by billions of people, there are millions of people who can afford one, yet only c.14k are produced each year.
Turning to the discount, EXOR now trades on a -57% discount, close to the widest it has ever traded. A normalisation to its 10-year average of -38% would yield a return of +44% all else equal.
As ever, untangling discounts is more of an art than a science, but our perception is that investors, particularly post Ferrari, need evidence of where the next leg of NAV growth will come from, and really need a reason to own EXOR. We believe that the company continues to build credibility in its ability to create shareholder value through new listed investments, such as Philips, and are highly excited about Lingotto, the asset management platform established in May 2023. The latter now accounts for 14% of NAV and was a key contributor of growth in 2025 and we suspect will play a similar role going forward.
Since 2009, EXOR has compounded its NAV at +16% p.a., some 470bps annual outperformance of the MSCI AC World Index. We believe that aligning capital with John Elkann is a highly attractive prospect, particularly at such a wide discount. We increased the position size by 2.7x over the period.
Joe Bauernfreund
Asset Value Investors Limited
3 June 2026
1 See Glossary in the full Half Year Report.
INVESTMENT PORTFOLIO
As at 31 March 2026
|
Company |
Portfolio classification |
% of |
IRR (%, £)1 |
ROI (%, £)2 |
Cost |
Valuation £'000 |
% of net assets |
|
News Corp |
Holding Company |
0.7% |
4.9% |
9.9% |
69,231 |
72,789 |
7.0% |
|
D'Ieteren Group |
Holding Company |
0.9% |
17.7% |
32.7% |
48,593 |
69,993 |
6.7% |
|
Harbourvest Global Private Equity |
Closed-ended Fund |
3.0% |
16.7% |
26.0% |
49,577 |
64,046 |
6.1% |
|
Jardine Matheson |
Holding Company |
0.4% |
nm |
38.4% |
46,791 |
62,923 |
6.0% |
|
Mitsubishi Logistics |
Asset-backed Special Situation |
2.8% |
13.4% |
9.1% |
58,993 |
62,638 |
6.0% |
|
Chrysalis Investments |
Closed-ended Fund |
15.9% |
0.6% |
1.2% |
62,518 |
62,399 |
6.0% |
|
Vivendi |
Holding Company |
3.3% |
-29.8% |
-30.2% |
76,212 |
52,357 |
5.0% |
|
Cordiant Digital Infrastructure |
Closed-ended Fund |
6.4% |
33.9% |
61.7% |
32,992 |
49,116 |
4.7% |
|
EXOR |
Holding Company |
0.4% |
8.2% |
21.6% |
50,715 |
48,333 |
4.6% |
|
Samsung C&T Ordinary shares |
Holding Company |
0.2% |
nm |
14.8% |
43,517 |
45,720 |
4.4% |
|
Top ten investments |
|
|
|
|
539,139 |
590,314 |
56.5% |
|
Partners Group Private Equity |
Closed-ended Fund |
7.8% |
5.4% |
14.4% |
44,486 |
40,745 |
3.9% |
|
Oakley Capital Investments |
Closed-ended Fund |
4.8% |
19.6% |
126.2% |
16,386 |
37,085 |
3.6% |
|
Rohto Pharmaceutical |
Asset-backed Special Situation |
1.2% |
-16.4% |
-23.8% |
43,316 |
31,810 |
3.0% |
|
Tokyo Gas |
Asset-backed Special Situation |
0.2% |
35.8% |
37.1% |
19,716 |
30,044 |
2.9% |
|
GCP Infrastructure Investments |
Closed-ended Fund |
4.6% |
13.7% |
28.8% |
26,088 |
27,588 |
2.7% |
|
Symphony International Holdings |
Closed-ended Fund |
15.7% |
5.7% |
41.4% |
26,636 |
27,541 |
2.6% |
|
Hyosung Corporation |
Holding Company |
2.5% |
nm |
10.6% |
24,365 |
26,249 |
2.5% |
|
Amorepacific Holdings |
Holding Company |
2.2% |
nm |
-13.6% |
27,035 |
23,022 |
2.2% |
|
Dai Nippon Printing |
Asset-backed Special Situation |
0.4% |
11.1% |
18.8% |
18,817 |
22,676 |
2.2% |
|
HD Hyundai |
Holding Company |
0.2% |
nm |
56.9% |
14,298 |
20,961 |
2.0% |
|
Top twenty investments |
|
|
|
|
800,282 |
878,035 |
84.1% |
|
Kyocera |
Asset-backed Special Situation |
0.1% |
7.1% |
9.5% |
18,956 |
20,889 |
2.0% |
|
Wacom |
Asset-backed Special Situation |
4.0% |
-5.7% |
-15.8% |
24,207 |
19,149 |
1.8% |
|
Youngone Holdings |
Holding Company |
1.3% |
nm |
44.2% |
12,739 |
18,406 |
1.8% |
|
Frasers Group |
Holding Company |
0.6% |
-11.7% |
-21.6% |
21,920 |
17,264 |
1.7% |
|
Christian Dior |
Holding Company |
0.0% |
13.9% |
60.7% |
15,100 |
17,019 |
1.6% |
|
Mitsui Osk Lines |
Asset-backed Special Situation |
0.1% |
nm |
-1.6% |
16,581 |
16,059 |
1.5% |
|
Daou Technology |
Holding Company |
1.6% |
nm |
-2.7% |
16,585 |
15,627 |
1.5% |
|
LG Chem Ordinary shares |
Holding Company |
0.1% |
nm |
-19.4% |
11,113 |
8,901 |
0.9% |
|
Malibu Life Holdings |
Closed-ended fund |
2.4% |
7.7% |
43.5% |
8,299 |
8,120 |
0.8% |
|
Cuckoo Holdings |
Holding Company |
1.4% |
nm |
-11.2% |
7,707 |
6,809 |
0.7% |
|
Top thirty investments |
|
|
|
|
953,489 |
1,026,278 |
98.4% |
|
SK Kaken |
Asset-backed Special Situation |
0.6% |
-5.2% |
-29.2% |
6,723 |
4,690 |
0.5% |
|
Cuckoo Homesys |
Holding Company |
1.8% |
nm |
-15.6% |
5,747 |
4,602 |
0.4% |
|
JPEL Private Equity |
Closed-ended Fund |
18.4% |
20.3% |
106.9% |
940 |
3,015 |
0.3% |
|
LG Chem Preferred shares |
Holding Company |
0.5% |
nm |
|
2,683 |
2,539 |
0.2% |
|
Gabia |
Holding Company |
1.0% |
-16.3% |
-9.7% |
1,811 |
1,630 |
0.1% |
|
Samsung C&T Preferred shares |
Holding Company |
1.1% |
nm |
|
1,471 |
1,353 |
0.1% |
|
Third Point Investors CVR+ |
Closed-ended Fund |
|
na |
na |
1,058 |
1,077 |
0.1% |
|
Third Point Investors Private Investments+ |
Closed-ended Fund |
|
-6.6% |
-16.8% |
563 |
466 |
0.0% |
|
Ashmore Global Opportunities - GBP+ |
Closed-ended Fund |
|
4.5% |
1.1% |
7 |
103 |
0.0% |
|
Better Capital (2009)+ |
Closed-ended Fund |
17.4% |
71.5% |
31.3% |
192 |
- |
0.0% |
|
Top forty investments |
|
|
|
|
974,684 |
1,045,753 |
100.1% |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Equity investments at fair value |
|
|
|
|
974,684 |
1,045,753 |
100.1% |
|
Other net current assets less current liabilities |
|
|
|
|
|
155,175 |
14.9% |
|
Non-current liabilities |
|
|
|
|
|
(156,725) |
-15.0% |
|
Net assets |
|
|
|
|
|
1,044,023 |
100.0% |
1 Internal Rate of Return. Calculated from inception of AVI Global Trust's investment. Refer to Glossary in the Half-Year Report.
2 Return on Investment. Calculated from inception of AVI Global Trust's investment. Refer to Glossary in the Half-Year Report.
3 Cost. Refer to Glossary in the Half-Year Report.
+ Level 3 Investment (see note 7 in the Half-Year Report).
FURTHER INFORMATION
AVI Global Trust Plc's Half Year Report for the period ended 31 March 2026 will be available today on https://www.aviglobal.co.uk.
It will also be submitted shortly in full unedited text to the Financial Conduct Authority's National Storage Mechanism and will be available for inspection at data.fca.org.uk/#/nsm/nationalstoragemechanism in accordance with DTR 6.3.5(1A) of the Financial Conduct Authority's Disclosure Guidance and Transparency Rules.
ENDS
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